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The returns of short-term reversal strategies in equity markets can be interpreted as a proxy for the
returns from liquidity provision. Analysis of reversal strategies shows that the expected return from
liquidity provision is strongly time-varying and highly predictable with the VIX index. Expected returns
and conditional Sharpe Ratios increase enormously along with the VIX during times of ￿nancial market
turmoil, such as the ￿nancial crisis 2007-09. Even reversal strategies formed from industry portfolios
(which do not yield high returns unconditionally) produce high rates of return and high Sharpe Ratios
during times of high VIX. The results point to withdrawal of liquidity supply, and an associated increase
in the expected returns from liquidity provision, as a main driver behind the evaporation of liquidity
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Liquidity evaporated in many sectors of ﬁnancial markets during the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-09.
In some markets, such as those for “toxic” asset-backed securities, trading activity reportedly
came to a complete halt.1 There are at least two possible explanations for this disappearance
of market liquidity. One is that the crisis ampliﬁed asymmetric information problems. For
example, Gorton and Metrick (2010) argue that large adverse shocks strongly increased the
information sensitivity of securitized debt. According to this view, the reduction in liquidity
is a symptom for aggravated adverse selection problems. An alternative and complementary
theory is that the market turmoil strained the inventory-absorption capacity of the market-
making sector, either because of a surge in liquidity demand from the public, or because
market makers reduced liquidity supply in response to elevated levels of risk, tighter funding
constraints, and reduced competition. According to this second view, the conditions during
the crisis raised the expected return from liquidity provision.
This paper studies this second channel using data from equity markets. The main objec-
tive is to estimate the extent by which the expected return from liquidity provision rises in
times of ﬁnancial market turmoil. The notion of “liquidity providers” adopted in this paper
is broad and not restricted to designated market makers. Liquidity provision in equity mar-
kets is increasingly performed by algorithmic traders and other quantitative investors that
perform, eﬀectively, a market-making role, but without being oﬃcially designated as market
makers (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011)). Even individual investors could perform
a liquidity provision role to some extent (Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008)).
To construct a proxy for the returns from liquidity provision, I examine reversal strategies
that buy stocks that went down over the prior days, and sell stocks that went up during the
prior days, as in Lehman (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990). This pattern of buying and
selling in reversal strategies resembles the trading of a market maker who sells when the
public buys (which tends to coincide with rising prices), and who buys when the public sells
1See Brunnermeier (2009) for a review.
1(which tends to coincide with falling prices). Setting up a model in which the public trades
for liquidity and informational reasons, and in which market makers have limited risk-bearing
capacity, I show that reversal strategy returns closely track the returns earned by liquidity
providers. Eﬀectively, reversal strategies use lagged returns as a noisy proxy for unobserved
market maker inventory imbalances. They proﬁt from the transitory price impact of order
ﬂow and the negative serial correlation in price changes that arises from market makers’
aversion to absorbing inventory. Price impact due to private information, in contrast, is
permanent and does not induce negative serial correlation (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)),
which allows me to isolate the variation in the expected returns from liquidity provision from
adverse selection eﬀects.2
The focus of this paper is to examine whether there is predictable time-variation in the
returns from liquidity provision. Recent work on risk-taking of ﬁnancial intermediaries sug-
gests that the VIX index of implied volatilities of S&P500 index options is a natural candidate
predictor. The theories in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
predict that higher volatility tightens funding constraints of market makers and thereby re-
duces their liquidity-provision capacity. Adrian and Shin (2010) argue that risk-management
constraints reduce the risk appetite of ﬁnancial intermediaries in times of high VIX. Ang,
Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011) and Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2011) ﬁnd that
hedge funds lose assets under management and reduce leverage in times of market turmoil
and high VIX. Motivating evidence also comes from a recent literature that ﬁnds the VIX to
be related to various asset-pricing phenomena that may be related to risk-taking of ﬁnancial
intermediaries, such as corporate bond liquidity (Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011)), foreign ex-
change carry trades (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008)) or sovereign credit-default
swaps (Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2010)).
Figure 1 illustrates some of the key ﬁndings of the paper. The solid line plots a three-
2In Glosten and Milgrom’s model, greater adverse selection leads to a wider bid-ask spread, but transaction
prices always follow a martingale (i.e., there is no bid-ask bounce), and market makers, as well as reversal
strategies, earn zero expected return.
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Figure 1: 3-month moving averages of daily return-reversal strategy returns and the CBOE
S&P500 implied volatility index (VIX). Each day t, the reversal strategy returns are calcu-
lated as the average of returns from ﬁve reversal strategies that weight stocks proportional to
the negative of market-adjusted returns on days t− 1, t− 2, ..., t−5, with weights scaled to
add up to $1 short and $1 long. Returns are calculated from daily CRSP closing transaction
prices, and returns are hedged against conditional market factor exposure.
month moving average of daily returns from a reversal strategy that invests $1 of capital each
day (with 50% margin for long and short positions) and weights stocks based on their prior
ﬁve days’ returns. Returns from the reversal strategy are close to 1% per day during the
LTCM crisis in 1998 and the Nasdaq decline in 2000/01. Subsequently, until 2007, reversal
strategy returns declined steadily to less than 0.2% per day, but then they virtually exploded
during the ﬁnancial crisis, reaching levels that exceed those seen during the LTCM crisis.
As the ﬁgure shows, this time-variation in the reversal strategy return is remarkably highly
correlated with the VIX index shown as the dotted line in terms of a three-month moving
average. Since the start of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007, reversal strategy returns and the VIX
track each other almost perfectly.
3Predictive regressions conﬁrm that the correlation between VIX and reversal strategy
returns is predictive, i.e., VIX forecasts reversal strategy returns. Both transaction-price
and quote-midpoint returns of reversal strategies are highly predictable with the VIX, but
the association is particularly strong with transaction-price returns. The strong relation-
ship between reversal strategy returns and VIX also persists when reversal strategy returns
are standardized by their conditional volatility, which eﬀectively shows that the conditional
Sharpe Ratio of reversal strategies is positively related to the VIX. Thus, not only does the
level of expected return from liquidity provision rise with the VIX, but the risk premium
earned by liquidity providers increases as well.
Khandani and Lo (2007) examine returns of a similar reversal strategy during the “quant
crisis” in August 2007 and ﬁnd that it produced substantial but largely transitory losses over a
period of a few days. The results in this paper show that reversal strategies were, in contrast,
highly proﬁtable during the subsequent ﬁnancial crisis period. Moreover, the downside risk of
these strategies is generally low. Returns are positively skewed, and as Figure 1 shows, there
was not a single three-month period from 1998 to 2010 in which this strategy lost money
(before costs of carrying out the trades). Thus, the experience during the “quant crisis” was
exceptional. Downside risk is unlikely to be the explanation for the high Sharpe Ratios of
liquidity provision strategies during times of high VIX.
While reversal strategies at the individual stock level are known to be proﬁtable (and
this paper adds the evidence that proﬁts are time-varying and highly predictable), I am
not aware of prior evidence in the literature that reversal strategies constructed from more
aggregated portfolios earn positive returns. Yet, common factors in order imbalances might be
particularly volatile during times of market turmoil, and market makers particularly averse to
absorbing them. To investigate this possibility, I also examine a reversal strategy constructed
from long-short positions in value-weighted industry portfolios. The evidence shows that this
inter-industry reversal strategy, too, earns high returns and high Sharpe Ratios when VIX is
high, which indicates that liquidity providers earn compensation for absorbing industry-level
4order imbalances in times of market turmoil.
The fact that expected returns from liquidity provision are strongly related to the VIX in-
dex does not necessarily imply that the VIX index itself is the state variable driving expected
returns from liquidity provision. More likely, the VIX proxies for the underlying state vari-
ables that drive the willingness of market makers to provide liquidity and the public’s demand
for liquidity. Uncovering these underlying state variables is diﬃcult, as they are likely to be
highly correlated with VIX and among each other, but I present some tentative evidence using
alternative predictor variables. Decomposing the VIX into conditional volatility and a volatil-
ity risk premium shows that both components predict reversal strategy returns, although the
conditional volatility part seems to be a somewhat stronger predictor. Several proxies for
liquidity supply factors predict reversal strategy returns. Idiosyncratic volatility, which might
be a concern for imperfectly diversiﬁed market makers, and the Treasury-Eurodollar (TED)
spread, a popular proxy for funding costs of ﬁnancial intermediaries, are positively related
to future returns from liquidity provision. Growth in primary dealer repo ﬁnancing, shown
by Adrian and Shin (2010) to be positively related to balance sheet size and risk appetite
of ﬁnancial intermediaries, is negatively related to the expected return from liquidity provi-
sion. However, these variables do not fully subsume the explanatory power of VIX in the
forecasting regression.
The ﬁndings in this paper relate to earlier work showing that market makers extract price
concessions for absorbing order imbalances over and above compensation for adverse selection.
As a result, inventory positions aﬀect prices and liquidity (Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan
(1998); Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010)), and the level of
inventory positions predicts returns over a horizon of several days (Hendershott and Seasholes
(2007)). The inventory data used in these studies are private information, while the reversal
strategies that I examine in this paper utilize only publicly available information, but over
a longer time period, which allows me to study time-variation in the expected return from
liquidity provision, particularly during the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-09.
5Existing work shows that volatility is negatively related to liquidity. Chordia, Sarkar, and
Subrahmanyam (2005) ﬁnd that positive volatility innovations in stock and bond markets
predict an increase in quoted spreads and a reduction of depth in those markets. Deuskar
(2008) ﬁnds that price impact of trades is higher when the volatility risk premium component
in VIX is high. The liquidity measures used in these papers capture adverse selection as well
as inventory imperfections. When these measures indicate illiquidity, this does not necessarily
imply high expected returns from liquidity provision. The reversal strategies examined in this
paper isolate the inventory-related component that drives the return from liquidity provision.
P´ astor and Stambaugh (2003) develop a liquidity measure related to short-term reversals,
but, unlike the reversal strategies in this paper, their liquidity measure is not interpretable as
a return (per dollar of capital) on a trading strategy, which makes it unsuitable for a study
of time-variation in the returns from liquidity provision. Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan
(2010) ﬁnd that bid-ask spreads and reversal strategy returns increase in the weeks following
large stock market market declines. I show that the VIX is a much more powerful predictor of
reversal strategy returns than lagged market returns, that Sharpe Ratios of reversal strategies
increase during times of high VIX, and that reversal strategy returns formed from industry
portfolios also have high expected returns when VIX is high.
2 Measuring Returns from Liquidity Provision
While it is intuitively clear that short-term reversal strategies approximate the trading pat-
terns of liquidity providers, and that they beneﬁt from the negative serial correlation in price
changes induced by imperfect liquidity provision, it is less clear precisely which speciﬁcation
of reversal strategies provides the best approximation of the returns from liquidity provision.
The returns of diﬀerent versions of reversal strategies can all be represented as scaled auto-
covariances of market-adjusted returns. But it is not clear which scaling of autocovariances
is most suitable for an assessment of the returns from liquidity provision. To clarify these
issues, this section presents a model that contains the key features of market microstructure
6models: The public trades for both informational and liquidity reasons (as in Kyle (1985)),
and market makers in this model are averse to taking on inventory (as in Grossman and Miller
(1988)). Within this model, one can compute the return from liquidity provision and compare
it to reversal strategy returns. This helps understand which reversal strategy speciﬁcation
approximates best the returns from liquidity provision and which factors could interfere with
this proxy relationship. The model should be thought of as applying to a relatively short time
period in which the parameters determining the expected return from liquidity provision are
roughly constant, while the subsequent empirical analysis will look at time-variation in the
expected return from liquidity provision at lower frequencies.
2.1 Model
Consider an asset market with a single risky asset in zero net supply, a riskless asset in
perfectly elastic supply at interest rate of zero, and discrete time, t = 0,1,2,...,T. There are
three groups of market participants: Informed traders, market makers, and liquidity traders.
The latter group trades an exogeneous amount zt each period.
The value of the risky asset in the ﬁnal period T is







which is paid as a terminal dividend. The innovations δt, ξt, and zt are jointly normal, IID




The signal ξt is public and observed at time t by all market participants. In contrast,
δt becomes public information at t, but informed traders observe a signal st−1 = δt one
period earlier, which means they have a short-lived informational advantage, as in Admati
and Pﬂeiderer (1988). Informed traders are competitive and myopic with CARA utility.3
3Assuming the variance of ξt to increase at an appropriate rate as t → T to compensate for the reduced
variance stemming from a lower number of remaining δt shocks one could make the setting IID in which
non-myopic demand functions would be equivalent to the myopic ones. For simplicity of exposition, I assume
myopia.
7Informed traders submit market orders, i.e., they cannot condition their demand on the price
in the current trading round, similar to Kyle (1985). As a result, the demand function of the
representative informed trader is
yt = βst, (2)
where β is increasing in the aggregate risk-bearing capacity of informed traders and decreasing
in the level of risk they perceive and the price impact that they expect to have in aggregate
(see Appendix A).
The representative competitive market maker has CARA utility with (myopic) asset de-
mand
mt = γ (E[δt+1|Mt] + vt − Pt), (3)
where Mt denotes market makers’ information set at time t, which includes prices and order
imbalances up to time t. The slope of demand, γ, captures the aggressiveness with which
market makers supply liquidity, which is increasing in the risk-bearing capacity of the market-
making sector, and decreasing in the level of risk. More generally, margin constraints, as in
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), or risk management
constraints, as in Adrian and Shin (2010), eﬀectively induce risk-averse behavior, and a
ﬁnite γ can be thought of as a reduced-form representation of these frictions. As shown in
Appendix A, E[δt+1|Mt] = φxt, where xt ≡ yt +zt is the total asset demand imbalance from
informed and liquidity traders absorbed by the market maker (which equals the negative of








captures the informativeness of xt about δt+1. Thus, E[δt+1|Mt] = φxt represents the market
maker’s best estimate of the information about st = δt+1 contained in xt.
8In equilibrium, dollar returns Rt+1 ≡ Pt+1 − Pt follow












In this model, order ﬂow ∆xt+1 = xt+1 −xt follows an MA(1) process with MA-coeﬃcient of
−1. The market maker provides immediacy and absorbs intertemporal imbalances in order
ﬂow, but over time these imbalances tend to cancel out, as in Grossman and Miller (1988),
and the market maker’s inventory is stationary.4
Equation (5) shows that returns have a predictable and an unpredictable component.
Since st+1 and zt+1 are IID over time, xt+1 is not predictable based on information at time t
(neither the market makers’ nor the informed traders’) and hence xt+1 represents unexpected
period t+1 order ﬂow, which has price impact for both informational reasons (captured by φ)
and because of imperfect supply of liquidity (captured by 1/γ). In contrast, −xt represents
the expected component of period t + 1 order ﬂow and it is associated with a predictable
return −(1/γ)xt that compensates market makers for bearing inventory risk. For example,
if market makers are long inventory in period t (xt < 0), then the return expected in period
t+1 is positive. Market makers’ limited risk-bearing capacity implies an imperfect supply of
immediacy, which in turn induces predictability and negative serial correlation into the return
process. By providing liquidity (in the form of immediacy), market makers earns positive
expected proﬁts.
2.2 Returns from liquidity provision
To calculate these returns from supplying liquidity, I now extend the model in a simple way
to a cross-section of i = 1,2,...,N securities. Let all variables in the model now carry i-
subscripts, and let δit and zit be jointly normal IID in the cross-section. I allow the public
information component of returns to be correlated across stocks by specifying a simple factor
4In Grossman and Miller (1988) order ﬂow imbalances have perfect negative serial correlation, while in this
model the correlation is not perfect because of the presence of the innovation of the MA(1) process.
9structure ξit = ft + eit, where f is a serially uncorrelated common factor (for simplicity all
stocks are assumed to have identical factor loadings, hence f is also the market factor) and
eit are cross-sectionally normal IID factor-model residuals.
The market making sector’s dollar gain in period t, aggregated across all N securities, is
−
PN
i=1 xit−1Rit. A calculation of market maker returns requires calculation of the capital
needed for carrying these inventory positions. One complication that arises in a CARA-
normal model is that prices can be negative, which is not realistic for stocks. To abstract
from such complications arising from the cross-sectional distribution of prices, and from
scale diﬀerences between stocks, I assume that prices of all securities at t − 1 are equal and
normalized to Pit−1 = 1.5 Assuming a 50% margin for both long and short positions,6 the
required capital is (1/2)
PN

























The returns from supplying liquidity earned by market makers are decreasing in market






Changing γ can be thought of as changing the supply of liquidity, while changing σx can be
5Approximately, this could hold, for example, if v0i = 1, and the price impacts of inventory imbalances
since t = 0 are small relative to the initial values v0i.
6This choice of margin is motivated by Regulation T, which is not necessarily the appropriate constraint for
hedge funds or market makers that may be able to use cross-margining or beneﬁt from exceptions (see, e.g.,
the Appendix in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). However, the empirical evidence on leverage of equity
hedge funds in Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011) is at least roughly consistent with 50% margins. In
any case, any other margin requirements can easily be accomodated here by scaling reversal strategy returns
up or down accordingly.
10thought of as changing the demand for liquidity.
In this setting, with cross-sectionally uncorrelated order ﬂow, and with securities that have
identical loadings on the common factor in the public information component of returns,
market maker returns converge to a constant as the number of securities goes to inﬁnity.
In reality, a market maker’s risk is unlikely to be fully diversiﬁable. First, market makers
specialize their market-making activities on a ﬁnite subset of securities, limiting their ability
to diversify. For example, Naik and Yadav (2003) ﬁnd that the liquidity provision of individual
dealers on the London Stock Exchange is aﬀected by dealer-speciﬁc inventory risks that are
diversiﬁable within the ﬁrm employing the dealers. Second, stocks have dispersed loadings
on common factors in order ﬂow and public information. Generalizing the model to allow for
dispersed factor loadings would yield the result that the reversal strategy loads on common
factors and therefore, as N → ∞, market maker returns converge to a non-degenerate random
variable.
Extending the model to capture limited diversiﬁability of risk exposures would not change
the basic message of the model that a ﬁnite γ induces negative serial correlation which
results in proﬁtable reversal strategies. The beneﬁt of such an extension would be that one
could endogenize γ. The model above is silent about the reasons why γ is ﬁnite. Limited
diversiﬁability, possibly combined with margin or risk-management constraints, would allow
endogenizing the limited risk-bearing capacity of market makers implied by the assumption
of a ﬁnite γ.
2.3 Empirical proxies for returns from liquidity provision
Empirically, the inventory positions of the entire market-making sector are not observable,
which renders infeasible a direct calculation of aggregate returns from market-making activi-
ties according to Eq. (7). Some researchers have obtained proprietary data sets on designated
market maker inventory positions (e.g., Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and
Seasholes (2010) for the NYSE). A limitation of these data is that they do not capture the
11increasingly important activities of hedge funds and other market participants that do not
have an oﬃcial market-making role, but eﬀectively compete with oﬃcial market makers in
providing liquidity. The data of Comerton-Forde et al. also do not include the ﬁnancial crisis
2007-09. This section shows that trading strategies that condition on past returns can be
used to approximate the return from liquidity provision earned by the market-making sector.
Moreover, some of the liquidity providers outside of the set of oﬃcial market makers might
actually employ precisely these kinds of trading strategies that condition on past returns in
their eﬀorts to capture some of the returns from liquidity provision that are available in the
market place.










(Rit−1 − Rmt−1), (9)
where Rmt−1 ≡ 1
N
PN
i=1 Rit−1 is the equal-weighted market index return. This is the reversal
strategy examined by Lehman (1990). The strategy earns positive returns if t − 1 returns
partly reverse in period t. The scaling by the ﬁrst term in parentheses in (9) ensures that
the strategy is always $1 short and $1 long. With 50% margin on long and short positions,











(Rit−1 − Rmt−1)Rit, (10)
can be interpreted as a return per dollar of capital invested. Appendix A shows that with a





















12is the volatility of the unexpected return driven by order ﬂow divided by the total cross-
sectional standard deviation of returns σR. If ρ does not change over time, then time-variation
in reversal strategy proﬁts tracks time-variation in the market maker proﬁts in (7) (scaled
by ρ). The presence of ρ in (11) arises from the fact that past returns are a noisy proxy
for market makers’ inventory positions −xit−1 because the public information component
in returns adds noise unrelated to inventory imbalances. As a consequence, the reversal
strategy eﬀectively uses up more capital than the market makers’ strategy, because it takes
positions proportional to −(Rit−1 − Rmt−1) rather than proportional to only the component
of −(Rit−1 − Rmt−1) driven by xit−1.
The model helps to understand how the speciﬁcation of the reversal strategy inﬂuences
the degree to which it approximates market makers’ returns from liquidity provision. In the
empirical analysis, two concerns might arise: (a) High values of LR
t might be the result of
a low variance of public information shocks (which lowers the denominator ρ but does not
aﬀect the numerator) rather than high LMM
t ; (b) high values of LR
t might reﬂect high φ
(which raises ρ towards one) rather than high LMM
t .
With regards to (a), it seems plausible that the variance share of the public information
component increases rather than decreases in times of market turmoil. If so, LR
t would
actually understate the extent to which market maker proﬁts increase during these times.
In any case, one can eliminate the dependence on the variance share of public information
shocks by considering an alternative reversal strategy with weights
wit = −(1/N)(Rit−1 − Rmt−1), (13)
as in Lo and MacKinlay (1990). The returns of this strategy converge to the negative of the











13and which is insensitive to changes in the volatility of the public information component.
With regards to (b), the elasticity of LR




(1 − ρ2). (15)
Thus, since 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, LR
t will typically increase when φ rises. However, one can construct an








(Rit−1 − Rmt−1). (16)
With these weights, the reversal strategy proﬁt is, eﬀectively, a cross-sectional estimate of
the negative of the autocorrelation of market-adjusted returns. In this case, the elasticity of




(1 − 2ρ2). (17)
For ρ2 > 0.5, the proﬁt of this reversal strategy actually falls when φ rises. The ﬁndings in
Hasbrouck (1991) and more recent evidence from Hendershott and Menkveld (2010) suggest
that unexpected order ﬂow explains about 1/3 of the variance of permanent (“eﬃcient”)
price changes. In addition, Hendershott and Menkveld (2010) show that order ﬂow also exerts
substantial transitory price pressure. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest values for ρ2 that
are likely close to or greater than 0.5. Thus, the proﬁts of this alternative “autocorrelation”
reversal strategy should be relatively insensitive, or even inversely related to changes in φ.
Thus, compared with these two alternative reversal strategies, the reversal strategy in
(9) that is used in the empirical analysis below strikes a balance between insensitivity to φ
and insensitivity to changes in the volatility of the public information component of returns.
The reversal strategy formed according to (9) has the added beneﬁt of a clear interpretation
as a $1 long/$1 short strategy. But, as shown in Appendix C, all the predictability results
14below also hold if one replaces the reversal strategy with these alternative ones based on
cross-sectional autocovariance or autocorrelation estimates. Time-variation in φ or in the
volatility of public information shocks is therefore unlikely to provide an explanation of the
predictability patterns reported in this paper.
2.4 Empirical Implementation and Data
The empirical implementation of the reversal strategies uses daily data on NYSE, AMEX,
and Nasdaq stocks from CRSP (see Appendix B). Mapping the model to the empirical data
requires some adjustments to take into account complexities that the model abstracts from
for the sake of clear intuition.
Individual stocks or portfolios. Most of the analysis employs reversal strategy portfolios
constructed from individual stocks. This is the proper approach to evaluate the expected
returns of liquidity providers overall. However, anecdotally, it seems that transitory price
pressure from order imbalances also aﬀect entire sectors of the market in a correlated way
during times of ﬁnancial turmoil (e.g., because mutual funds concentrated in certain sectors
face outﬂows), and market makers may, at the same time, be averse to absorbing these
correlated imbalances. For this reason, I also examine reversal strategies constructed with
industry portfolios as basis assets. The industry portfolios are constructed by classifying
stocks into 48 industries as in Fama and French (1997).7 I am not aware of evidence in the
literature that a reversal strategy based on industry portfolios is proﬁtable unconditionally,
but I investigate here whether it is proﬁtable conditional on high levels of the VIX index.
Return measurement horizon. It is not obvious how one should interpret empirically the
period length in the model. While analyses of microstructure models often focus on intraday
data, inventory imbalances, and their associated price eﬀects, are likely to persist beyond a
daily horizon. For example, Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1998) report that the average
half-life of dealer inventory positions on the London Stock Exchange is roughly two days.
7I thank Ken French for providing the industry classiﬁcation on his website.
15Hendershott and Menkveld (2010), using NYSE data, ﬁnd half-lifes ranging from half a day
for the largest stocks to two days for the smallest stocks. These ﬁndings suggest that data
at daily frequency may allow to capture much of the eﬀects of imperfect liquidity provision.
A related issue arises from the model’s omission, for the sake of simplicity, of features that
can cause positive serial correlation in returns. As shown, for example, in Wang (1994)
and Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002), long-lived private information can induce
positive serial correlation at short horizons. Conditioning reversal strategy day-t portfolio
weights only on day t−1 returns could understate the returns from supplying liquidity in this
case. To address this, I calculate the returns of the reversal strategies as an overlay of the
returns of ﬁve sub-strategies: One with portfolio weights conditioned on day t − 1 returns,
one conditioned on day t − 2 data, ..., one conditioned on t − 5 data. I then take the simple
average of these ﬁve sub-strategies’ returns as the overall reversal strategy return. Adding
lags beyond the ﬁrst lag helps in case of short-run continuation and delayed reversal, but
does not introduce distorting eﬀects in case these additional lags of returns do not predict
future returns. With exception of the industry portfolio results, which do exhibit some return
continuations at a daily horizon, the results in the empirical analysis are not sensitive to the
choice of lags (see Appendix C).
Bid-ask spreads. If calculated based on transaction prices, the reversal strategy returns
represent the returns of a hypothetical representative liquidity supplier whose limit orders
or quotes always get executed at the closing transaction price. To assess the returns from
liquidity provision earned by the market-making sector as a whole, including all designated
and de-facto market makers, this perspective makes sense, as the market-making sector does
not pay the bid-ask spread, but instead earns the non-adverse selection component of the
bid-ask spread, i.e., the part that induces negative serial correlation in transaction-price
returns.8 However, it would also interesting to see how much of the returns from liquidity
8The existence of positive bid-ask spreads need not necessarily imply negative serial correlation in trans-
action price changes. If adverse selection was the only reason for the existence of bid-ask spreads, transaction
prices would follow a martingale (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Only the part of the bid-ask spread in excess
of the adverse selection component, which compensates market makers for taking on inventory or reﬂects
16provision arise from this bid-ask bounce in transaction prices, and how much is attributable
to negative serial correlation in quote-midpoint changes. For this reason, I calculate reversal
strategy returns both with returns based on daily closing transaction prices (for all stocks) as
well as returns based on the midpoints of bid and ask closing quotes as recorded (for Nasdaq
stocks only) by CRSP. In each case, the portfolio weights are calculated with the same type
of return (on days t − 1 to t − 5) as the type used to calculate portfolio returns (on day t).
Common factors in returns. Reversal strategies of the sort analyzed in this paper have a
rather mechanical time-varying exposure to common factors. For example, consider a return-
reversal strategy that buys stocks with negative market-adjusted returns on day t − 1 and
shorts those with positive market-adjusted returns on day t − 1. If the market index went
up on day t − 1, this strategy tends to be long low-beta stocks and short high-beta stocks,
resulting in a negative conditional beta for the strategy on day t. Similarly, the strategy tends
to have a positive conditional beta following days on which the market went down. Along
the same lines, time-varying factor exposures can arise with respect to other common factors
in stock returns. Market makers might hedge some of these common factor exposures, as the
factor loadings are straightforward to predict based on the sign of lagged factor realizations.
Hedging market factor risk would also be relatively simple in practice, e.g. with S&P 500
futures contracts. For this reason, I focus on the returns of hedged reversal strategies after
eliminating time-varying market factor exposure. I ﬁrst estimate a regression
LR
t = β0 + β1ft + β2 (ft × sgn(ft−1)) + εt, (18)
where ft is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index and LR
t is the reversal strategy
return. The time-varying beta is βt−1 = β1 + β2 sgn(ft−1), which is then used to calculate
hedged returns as LR
t − βt−1ft.
Heterogeneity in scale. In the model, all stocks have the same size. In reality, there is
enormous dispersion in size. Market maker inventory portfolios and their proﬁts are likely to
market power of market makers, generates negative serial correlation and positive reversal strategy proﬁts.
17be dominated by large stocks. For this reason, Appendix C reports results for an alternative
value-weighted reversal strategy where portfolio weights are proportional to the negative
of market-adjusted return times the lagged market capitalization of the stock. These results
convey a similar message about time-variation in the expected returns from liquidity provision
as those reported in the main part of the paper. Section 3.4 constructs reversal strategies for
subgroups of stocks sorted by several stock characteristics, including size.
Sample period and institutional change. The sample period runs from the beginning of
1998 to the end of December 2010. The start of the sample period is set in 1998 because a
substantial change in order-handling rules on Nasdaq was phased in throughout 1997. This
institutional change, together with Department of Justice investigations and public scrutiny
following the Christie and Schultz (1994) ﬁndings, resulted in a dramatic decrease in bid-ask
spreads and trading costs on Nasdaq in the pre-1998 period (Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel,
and Schulz (1999)). These changes are also likely to aﬀect the returns from liquidity provision
and the serial correlation properties of price changes for many stocks. The presence of these
institutional regime changes in the sample could therefore obscure the time-series relation
between the expected returns from liquidity provision and market turmoil factors (as proxied
for by VIX) that are the focus of this paper. Even the post-1998 period saw some institutional
changes, though. The likely most important change was the introduction of decimalization
in 2001. Bessembinder (2003) ﬁnds that while this change was associated with a substantial
decline in quoted bid-ask spreads, it did not reduce eﬀective bid-ask spreads, and so it may
not have a big eﬀect on reversal strategy proﬁtability. Nevertheless, to control for possible
eﬀects, the empirical analysis below employs a dummy for the pre-decimalization period.
183 Time-Variation in Expected Returns from Liquidity Provi-
sion
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the reversal strategy returns. Panel A presents statistics
for the raw returns of these strategies, while Panel B shows similar statistics for hedged
returns, which are obtained by eliminating conditional market factor exposure. These hedged
returns are the focus of the empirical analysis that follows. Comparing Panels A and B,
the mean returns are almost identical, but the standard deviations of the hedged strategy
returns are moderately smaller. This reﬂects the fact that conditional market factor exposure
constitutes a signiﬁcant contribution to the total volatility of reversal strategy returns, and
this component is eliminated in Panel B. Moreover, while unconditional betas in Panel A are
close to 0.10, unconditional betas are virtually exactly zero in Panel B, as one would expect.
Whether the calculation of returns is done with quote-midpoints or transaction prices
makes a substantial diﬀerence. While return standard deviations are similar with the two
approaches, the mean returns are only about half as big when quote-midpoints are used
to calculate returns. This indicates that a substantial portion, although by far not all, of
the reversal strategy returns with transaction prices arise from the bid-ask bounce. For
the industry return-reversal strategy, however, there is virtually no diﬀerence between the
transaction-price and quote-midpoint returns, and so I report only the transaction-price re-
turns here and in the analysis below.9
Focusing on mean returns, it is apparent that the reversal strategies constructed from
individual stocks earn very high returns with relatively low volatility (for comparison, the
mean return per day of the CRSP value-weighted index during the sample period is 0.02%
with a standard deviation of 1.35%). This is also reﬂected in the enormous Sharpe ratios of the
reversal strategies at the bottom of Panels A and B (for comparison, the CRSP value-weighted
9At the end of each day, some stocks’ closing prices are at the bid, some are at the ask, and so averaging
transaction-price returns across all stocks within an industry portfolio yields virtually the same result as
averaging the quote-midpoint returns.
19Table 1: Summary Statistics of Reversal Strategy Returns
The daily reversal strategy return is calculated as the average of the returns, on day t, of ﬁve sub-
strategies that weight stocks (or industries) proportional to the negative of market-adjusted returns
on days t−1, t−2, ..., t−5, with weights scaled to add up to $1 short and $1 long. Transaction-price
returns are calculated from daily CRSP closing prices. Quote-midpoint returns are calculated from
bid-ask midpoints of daily CRSP closing quotes (with Nasdaq stocks only). The industry return-
reversal strategy is calculated with transaction prices. The sample period runs from January 1998 to
December 2010.
Indiv. stock reversal Industry
Transact. Quote- portfolio
prices midpoints reversal
Panel A: Raw returns
Mean return (% per day) 0.30 0.18 0.02
Std.dev. (% per day) 0.56 0.61 0.52
Skewness 3.02 2.74 1.06
Kurtosis 38.21 40.50 17.93
Worst day return (%) -3.88 -4.76 -3.93
Worst 3-month return (%) 2.56 -2.13 -9.28
Beta 0.11 0.11 0.09
Annualized Sharpe Ratio 8.44 4.50 0.56
Panel B: Returns hedged for conditional market factor exposure
Mean return (% per day) 0.29 0.17 0.01
Std.dev. (% per day) 0.48 0.54 0.47
Skewness 2.45 2.26 0.88
Kurtosis 31.26 34.51 15.97
Worst day return (%) -2.26 -3.92 -3.12
Worst 3-month return (%) 2.27 -1.28 -7.87
Beta 0.00 0.00 0.00
Annualized Sharpe Ratio 9.58 4.91 0.44
20index has a realized Sharpe Ratio of 0.26 during the sample period). Thus, the volatility of the
reversal strategy returns by itself is unlikely to be the main impediment that deters investors
from investing more aggressively in these kinds of strategies and supplying liquidity. The
industry return-reversal strategy is diﬀerent. It earns much lower mean returns than the
individual-stock reversal strategies, leading to a much lower Sharpe Ratio (but one that is
still higher than the Sharpe Ratio of the CRSP value-weighted index). Thus, unconditionally
at least, the evidence indicates that inventory-induced reversals of price changes are less
prevalent at the industry portfolio level than at the individual stock level.
The statistics in the table also indicate that exposure to asymmetric downside risk can
be ruled out as a potential explanation for the high Sharpe Ratios. Reversal strategy returns
have positive skewness, and while there are instances of losses of several percent on a given
day, there is no three-month period in the sample period in which the individual-stock reversal
strategy lost money in terms of transaction-price returns. Even with quote-midpoint returns,
the worst three-month loss is only a few percent (the corresponding number for the CRSP
value-weighted index is -52%).
Fixed costs for high-speed market access and technological requirements for successful
placement of orders that capture order ﬂow probably play an important role in preventing
more aggressive entry into the liquidity provision business. After accounting for these ﬁxed
costs, Sharpe ratios would likely be much less extreme. In any case, the focus of this paper
is on the relative variation over time in the expected returns and conditional Sharpe Ratios
of these reversal strategies, rather than the level of unconditional mean returns and Sharpe
Ratios.
3.1 Predicting Returns from Liquidity Provision with VIX
Turning to time-variation in the expected returns from liquidity provision, I focus on the VIX
index as a “market turmoil” state variable to predict the returns of reversal strategies. Table
212 presents predictive regressions of the form
LR
t = a + bV IXt−5 + c′gt−5 + et, (19)
where LR
t is the reversal strategy return on day t. VIX is lagged by ﬁve days to account for the
fact that the portfolio weights of the day t reversal strategy are conditioned on returns from
days t − 1 to t − 5. In these regressions, the VIX is normalized to a daily volatility measure
by dividing it by
√
250. To control for eﬀects of the institutional changes associated with
decimalization, the control variable vector gt−5 includes a dummy variable that takes a value
of one prior to decimalization (April 9, 2001) and a value of zero thereafter. Furthermore,
I also include RM, the lagged four-week return on the value-weighted CRSP index up until
the end of day t − 5 to capture the dependence of reversal strategy proﬁts on lagged market
returns documented in Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010).
As column (1) of Table 2 shows, reversal strategies constructed from individual stocks
have returns that are strongly predictable with the VIX. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient
(0.22) is big relative to the standard error shown in parenthesis (0.02). An increase of
one percentage point in the normalized VIX (corresponding to an increase of
√
250 ≈ 16
percentage points in the annualized VIX) is associated with an increase of 0.22 percentage
points in the daily returns of the return-reversal strategy. The sizeable economic magnitude
of the eﬀect is evident from the adj. R2 of 0.07, which is extremely high for a predictive
regression with daily returns. Column (2) adds the pre-decimalization dummy as a control,
which reduces the coeﬃcient on VIX only marginally. Adding the lagged market return as
an explanatory variable in column (3) also only has a weak eﬀect, and VIX remains a strong
predictor. Columns (5) to (7) repeat the same regressions, but now with reversal strategy
returns calculated from quote-midpoint returns. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is about
two-thirds of the coeﬃcient obtained with transaction-price returns, but everything else is
similar.
Columns (9) to (11) examine the predictability of reversal strategy returns using industry
22Table 2: Predicting Reversal Strategy Returns with VIX
In the daily regressions, the dependent variable is the reversal strategy return on day t (in percent), and the predictor variables are
measured at the end of day t − 5. In the monthly regressions, the dependent variable is the monthly average of daily reversal strategy
returns, and the predictor variables are measured ﬁve days before the end of the month preceding the return measurement month. VIX,
the CBOE S&P500 implied volatility index, is normalized to a daily volatility measure by dividing it by
√
250. The control variables
include a dummy for the time period prior to decimalization (April 9, 2001), and RM, the lagged four-week return on the value-weighted
CRSP index. Newey-West HAC standard errors (with 20 lags for daily data and 3 lags for monthly data) are reported in parentheses.
Quote-midpoint returns are calculated from bid-ask midpoints of daily CRSP closing quotes (with Nasdaq stocks only). The industry
reversal strategy is calculated with transaction prices. The sample period runs from January 1998 to December 2010.
Individual stocks Individual stocks Industry
Transaction-price returns Quote-midpoint returns portfolios
Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
VIX 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Pre-decim. 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
RM -0.60 -0.03 -0.59 -0.16 -0.42 -0.05
(0.19) (0.26) (0.21) (0.28) (0.17) (0.16)
Adj. R2 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.56 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07
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3portfolios as basis assets. Even though the industry reversal strategy is unconditionally not
proﬁtable (the ﬁtted value with normalized VIX at the sample mean of 1.4% is close to zero),
its returns vary substantially with VIX. An increase of one percentage point in the normalized
VIX raises the expected daily return by 0.07 percentage points. The ﬁtted value correspond-
ing to VIX levels of 60% reached during the height of the ﬁnancial crisis (which corresponds
to roughly 4% for the normalized VIX used in the regression) is a conditional expected return
of about 0.20% per day. This indicates that there is either unusual industry-level liquidity
demand from the public (e.g., because of greater commonality of within-industry order imbal-
ances), or that market makers are particularly averse to absorbing correlated order imbalances
in times of high VIX.
Columns (4), (8), and (12) explore monthly regressions in which the daily reversal strategy
returns are averaged within each calendar month, and the predictor variables are measured
ﬁve days before the end of the prior month. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient on VIX is
very close to the coeﬃcient in the corresponding daily regression, which indicates that the
predictable component in reversal strategy returns persists far beyond one day. As a conse-
quence, the monthly adj. R2 is enormous, reaching 56% for transaction-price returns, 25%
for quote-midpoint returns, and a still sizeable 7% for the industry portfolio reversal strategy,
which underscores the economic signiﬁcance of the predictability associated with VIX.
The high degree of predictability is also apparent in Figure 2. The plots on the left-hand
side average the dependent variable (solid line) and the ﬁtted values from the predictive
regressions in Table 2, columns (1), (5), and (9) (dotted line), within three-month rolling
windows. Focusing on the ﬁrst row, which shows the transaction-price returns of the reversal
strategy constructed from individual stocks, the in-sample ﬁt (in terms of these three-month
moving averages) of these regressions is extremely good.
However, the VIX is quite persistent, and so a natural concern is how well this in-sample
ﬁt extends out of sample.10 An out-of-sample analysis would also be an interesting check of
10The persistence of the predictor does not lead to a noticeable predictive regression bias in this case, though;
see Appendix C
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Figure 2: In-sample and out-of-sample predicted reversal strategy returns. The ﬁgure shows
3-month moving averages of daily reversal strategy returns and of ﬁtted values from predictive
regressions on lagged VIX as in columns (1), (5), and (9) of Table 2. The left-hand side plots
show the in-sample ﬁtted values, the plots on the right-hand side show the out-of-sample
ﬁtted values when the predictive regression is estimated with data up to the end of June
2007.
25the extent to which the enormous increase in reversal strategy returns during the ﬁnancial
crisis could have been predicted conditional on pre-crisis estimates of the predictive regression
coeﬃcients and conditional on the time path of VIX realized during the crisis. For these
reasons, the plots on the right-hand side look at an out-of-sample experiment. The predictive
regressions are estimated with data leading up to June 2007, i.e. until just before the onset
of the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-09. The plot then compares the three-month moving averages
of realized reversal strategy returns with the out-of-sample prediction based on the pre-
June 2007 coeﬃcient estimates. As the plot in the top row shows, the out-of-sample ﬁt for
transaction-price returns is remarkably good. In other words, the increase in reversal strategy
proﬁtability during the ﬁnancial crisis corresponds closely to what one would have expected
conditional on the rise in VIX, given the relationship between VIX and reversal strategy
proﬁts that was apparent before the crisis. For quote-midpoint returns, the out-of-sample
ﬁt is good, too, but the out-of-sample predictions underestimate to some extent the reversal
strategy returns during the height of the crisis. For the industry-portfolio reversal strategy
in the bottom row, the out-of-sample ﬁt also picks up a substantial part of the increase
in reversal strategy proﬁts during the ﬁnancial crisis, but the ﬁt is not as good as for the
individual-stock reversal strategies, which partly simply reﬂects the fact that even in-sample,
the returns of the industry-portfolio reversal strategy are less predictable.
3.2 Time-variation in Compensation for Risk
The volatility of individual-stock reversal strategy returns is generally low relative to the mean
returns earned by these strategies, but it is possible that periods of ﬁnancial market turmoil
could also produce bursts of substantially higher volatility of reversal strategy returns. To
interpret the predictability of reversal strategy returns, it would be useful to know whether
the rise in expected reversal strategy returns with VIX is just commensurate with a rise in
their volatility, or whether the compensation per unit of risk increases as well. In Grossman
and Miller (1988), a rise in the volatility of returns would increase the expected return from
26liquidity provision, but not the Sharpe Ratio, unless market makers’ participation costs or
their risk aversion rose as well. Thus, if Sharpe Ratios from liquidity provision are higher
in times of high VIX, this would indicate that additional impediments to liquidity provision
such as funding constraints (Gromb and Vayanos (2002); Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009))
may be relevant.
For this reason, I now investigate to what extent the conditional Sharpe Ratios of reversal
strategies vary with VIX. I specify the conditional mean of the reversal strategy return as
E[LR
t |V IXt−5] = σtθt, (20)
where σt ≡ Var(LR
t |V IXt−5)1/2, and θt is the Sharpe Ratio conditional on V IXt−5. Both σt
and θt are assumed to be linear in V IXt−5 and a pre-decimalization dummy dt−5,
σt = a0 + a1V IXt−5 + a2dt−5 (21)
θt = b0 + b1V IXt−5 + b2dt−5. (22)
The earlier evidence of a positive relationship between VIX and reversal strategy returns
could be explained either by a1 > 0 or b1 > 0.
To estimate σt conditional on lagged VIX, I run predictive regressions
|˜ LR
t |κ = a0 + a1V IXt−5 + a2dt−5 + ut, (23)
where ˜ LR
t is the residual from the regression of daily reversal strategy returns on V IXt−5











to account for the diﬀerence between standard deviation and expected absolute value.11 The
11In a large sample drawn from a (mean zero) normal distribution, κ would equal
p
π/2, the ratio of the
standard deviation to the expected absolute value.
27Table 3: Conditional Sharpe Ratios of Reversal Strategies
The dependent variable is the reversal strategy return on day t standardized by its conditional volatil-
ity, which is estimated by regressing (scaled) absolute unexpected reversal strategy returns on lagged
VIX. The VIX is measured at the end of day t − 5, and it is normalized to a daily volatility measure
by dividing it by
√
250. The regressions include a dummy for the time period prior to decimalization
(April 9, 2001). Newey-West HAC standard errors (with 20 lags) are reported in parentheses. The





Intercept 0.33 0.10 -0.12
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
VIX 0.13 0.13 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Pre-decim. 0.23 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Adj. R2 0.02 0.01 0.00




= b0 + b1V IXt−5 + b2dt−5 + et. (25)
The ﬁtted value from (25) represents the conditional Sharpe ratio of the reversal strategy
return.
Table 3 presents the results. The regressions show that the VIX still has strong explana-
tory power after scaling returns with the reciprocal of their conditional volatility. The point
estimates of the coeﬃcient on VIX are far larger than the standard errors, and the economic
magnitudes are big. For the individual-stock reversal strategy with transaction-price returns
in column (1), a one percentage point increase in the VIX corresponds to an increase in the
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Figure 3: Annualized conditional Sharpe Ratios of reversal strategy returns
conditional (annualized) Sharpe Ratio by 0.13.12 With quote-midpoint returns in column (2),
a one percentage point increase in VIX is associated with a similar increase in the conditional
Sharpe Ratio of 0.13. As in the previous unscaled regressions in Table 2, the coeﬃcients on
VIX for the industry portfolio reversal strategy are somewhat smaller, but still economically
big.
To illustrate the time-variation in the magnitudes of conditional Sharpe Ratios, Figure 3
plots the ﬁtted values from the regressions in Table 3. To focus on the variation in condi-
tional Sharpe ratios associated with variation in VIX, the pre-decimalization dummy is set
to zero for the whole sample in the calculation of the ﬁtted values. The solid lines represent
transaction-price returns, quote-midpoint returns are shown as dotted lines, and conditional
Sharpe Ratios for industry-portfolio reversal strategy returns as dashed line. The plots clearly
show the substantial increase in conditional Sharpe Ratios during times of ﬁnancial market
12Both the dependent variable and the VIX must be multiplied by
√
250 to get annualized numbers, and
hence the coeﬃcients in the table directly provide the eﬀect of annualized VIX on annualized Sharpe Ratios.
29turmoil, such as the LTCM crisis in late 1998, and, much more dramatically, the ﬁnancial
crisis in 2007-09. The plots also show a pronounced spike in the second quarter of 2010
in which the European sovereign debt crisis lead to elevated levels of the VIX index. The
volatility of reversal strategy returns is higher in times of high VIX, which dampens the rise
in conditional Sharpe Ratios compared with the rise in conditional expected returns. For
example, the conditional expected return of the individual-stock reversal strategy calculated
from transaction prices rose almost ten-fold from the pre-crisis period to the fourth quarter of
2008, while the conditional Sharpe Ratio only doubled. As the ﬁgure shows, the variation in
conditional Sharpe Ratios is still substantial, though. This indicates that liquidity providers
earn a higher compensation per unit of risk in times of high VIX.
3.3 Exploring the Role of the VIX
The results so far show that the VIX captures very well the time-variation in the expected
returns and the risk premium from providing liquidity. This does not necessarily mean that
the VIX index itself is the state variable driving expected returns from liquidity provision.
More likely, the VIX proxies for the underlying state variables that drive the willingness of
market makers to provide liquidity and the public’s demand for liquidity. Uncovering these
underlying state variables is diﬃcult, as they are likely highly correlated with VIX and among
each other. For example, the severity of funding constraints, the level of risk, and perhaps
also risk aversion on the part of market makers might all have spiked simultaneously during
the ﬁnancial crisis, and hence a time-series analysis will have a hard time disentangling these
eﬀects. Nevertheless, this section attempts to shed some light on potential underlying drivers
of the predictability associated with VIX.
Given that VIX represents the square root of the risk-neutral expectation of variance, a
natural question to ask ﬁrst is whether the expectation of future variance under the physical
measure or the variance risk premium drive the predictability of reversal strategy proﬁts.
If the variance risk premium captures option market makers’, and perhaps more generally
30ﬁnancial intermediaries’ aversion to absorbing inventory, as argued by Gˆ arleanu, Pedersen,
and Poteshman (2009), then not only the expected variance component, but also the variance
risk premium component might be related to the returns from supplying liquidity.13
Table 4 repeats the regressions from Table 2, but with the VIX broken up into its two
components. In column (1), the regression includes σM, the square root of a GARCH(1,1)
forecast of the variance of the S&P500 index return over a 21 trading-day horizon. This
horizon corresponds to the approximately one calendar-month maturity of the options that
are underlying the VIX index. The GARCH(1,1) model is estimated with daily S&P500
returns over the full sample period from 1998 to 2010. Conditional volatility σM is then
constructed as a multi-period forecasts from these estimates. The volatility risk premium is
represented by VIX - σM.
As column (1) shows using transaction-price returns, both components of the VIX con-
tribute roughly equally, in terms of the magnitude of their coeﬃcients, to the individual-stock
reversal strategy proﬁtability. Including lagged market returns in column (2) only has a mi-
nor eﬀect on the coeﬃcient estimates. Both components are also signiﬁcant predictors in
the monthly regressions in column (3). With quote-midpoint returns in columns (5) to (7),
however, most of the predictability is driven by the expected variance component and not
by the variance risk premium. The same tends to be true for the industry-portfolio reversal
strategy.
To the extent that the volatility forecast σM contains errors due to imprecision in estima-
tion or omission of relevant conditioning information beyond the information captured in the
GARCH model, it is also possible that the V IX − σM variable picks up an expected volatil-
ity component missed by the GARCH forecast. The VIX is calculated from market prices of
options and therefore may contain information about future volatility above and beyond the
13In a simple aﬃne jump-diﬀusion model with constant prices of risk, the volatility risk premium is a linear
function of spot volatility, which would imply that expected variance and the volatility risk premium can be
collinear [see, e.g., Chernov (2007)]. However, stochastic volatility of volatility or time-varying prices of risk
break this collinearity. Empirically, estimates of the two components of VIX are positively correlated, but far
from perfectly so. Nevertheless, their role may be diﬃcult to disentangle with relatively short time series.
31Table 4: Predicting Reversal Strategy Returns: Separating Conditional Volatility and the Volatility Risk Premium
In the daily regressions, the dependent variable is the reversal strategy return on day t (in percent), and the predictor variables are
measured at the end of day t − 5. The regression includes σM, the square root of a GARCH(1,1) forecast of the variance of the S&P500
index return over a 21 trading-day horizon, corresponding to the approximately one calendar-month maturity of the options underlying
VIX. The forecast is obtained by estimating the GARCH model with daily data, and then constructing multi-period forecasts from these
estimates. VIX - σM represents an estimate of the volatility risk premium. VIX is normalized to a daily volatility measure by dividing it
by
√
250. In the monthly regressions, the dependent variable is the monthly average of daily reversal strategy returns, and the predictor
variables are measured ﬁve days before the end of the month preceding the return measurement month. The monthly regression includes
σM(RV ), the square root of an ARMA(1,1) variance forecast constructed from a monthly series of realized variances from Bollerslev,
Gibson, and Zhou (2011). The monthly realized variances are the sum of squared 5-minute returns of the S&500 within each month. Both
the GARCH model for σM and the ARMA model for σM(RV ) are estimated in sample over the full sample period. The control variables
include a dummy for the time period prior to decimalization (April 9, 2001), and RM, the lagged four-week return on the value-weighted
CRSP index. Newey-West HAC standard errors (with 20 lags for daily data and 3 lags for monthly data) are reported in parentheses.
The sample period runs from January 1998 to December 2010, except for columns (4), (8), and (12), where the sample period ends in
February 2010 due to limited availability of the realized volatility series.
Individual stocks Individual stocks
Transaction-price returns Quote-midpoint returns Industry portfolios
Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
VIX - σM 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
σM 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
VIX - σM(RV ) 0.15 0.08 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
σM(RV ) 0.15 0.13 0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
Pre-decim. 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.22) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
RM -0.60 -0.05 -0.07 -0.58 -0.19 -0.13 -0.42 -0.08 -0.02
(0.18) (0.27) (0.29) (0.20) (0.29) (0.33) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Adj. R2 0.11 0.11 0.56 0.56 0.04 0.04 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.07
3
2GARCH forecast. To check robustness, columns (4), (8), and (12) report monthly regressions
that use an alternative volatility forecast in constructing σM. I obtain a monthly realized
variance series for the S&P500 index from Bollerslev, Gibson, and Zhou (2011),14 where each
monthly observation is the within-month sum of squared 5-minute returns. I estimate an
ARMA(1,1) model, the preferred model in Bollerslev, Gibson, and Zhou (2011), from these
monthly realized variance observations, and I use the ARMA(1,1) forecast at the end of each
month as the expected variance, and the square root of this expected variance is denoted
σM(RV ). Using this alternative measure of expected variance yields a slightly stronger eﬀect
for the variance risk premium for all three types of reversal strategies.
Overall, the results suggest that both the expected volatility component and the variance
risk premium embedded in the VIX help forecast the returns from supplying liquidity. How-
ever, the bid-ask bounce component of reversal strategy returns (transaction price returns
minus quote-midpoint returns) seems to be explained mostly by the variance risk premium,
while the quote-midpoint reversal component is explained mostly by the expected variance
component. This diﬀerence is intriguing, but theory does not yet provide much guidance on
potential causes for this diﬀerence. The models in Ho and Stoll (1981) and Hendershott and
Menkveld (2010) predict that the strength of quote-midpoint reversals depends on the magni-
tude of inventory imbalances absorbed by market makers, while the size of the bid-ask spread
and the strength of the bid-ask bounce eﬀect do not depend on inventory positions.15 Thus,
interpreted through the lens of these models, the ﬁndings above suggest the possibility that
the variance risk premium might be correlated more strongly with liquidity supply factors
(market power and risk-bearing capacity of market makers), which drive the bid-ask bounce,
while expected volatility may be more strongly related to liquidity demand factors (variance
of inventory imbalances) which, in addition to liquidity supply factors, inﬂuence the strength
of quote-midpoint reversals. A further evaluation of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of
14I thank Hao Zhou for providing the data on his website
15In these models, the bid-ask spread does not have an adverse selection component, and hence a greater
bid-ask spread introduces stronger negative serial correlation into transaction price changes.
33this paper, but it would be interesting to investigate this further in future research.
Table 5 looks at predictor variables that should proxy for liquidity supply factors. These
alternative predictors include the level of idiosyncratic volatility (measured as the cross-
sectional standard deviation of individual stock returns during the prior month) as a proxy
for the level of risk faced by imperfectly diversiﬁed liquidity providers, the TED spread (the
3-month Eurodollar deposit rate minus the 3-month Treasury Bill rate) as a proxy for funding
costs of ﬁnancial intermediaries (see, e.g., Gˆ arleanu and Pedersen (2011)), and the 13-week
growth rate in primary dealer repurchase agreements (repo) based on weekly data from the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Repo is one of the main funding sources of broker-dealers
and Adrian and Shin (2010) show that expansion and contraction of broker-dealer balance
sheets happens largely via expansion and contraction of repo. Times of high repo growth
appear to be associated with high intermediary risk appetite and therefore, presumably,
aggressive liquidity provision.16
The results in Table 5 show that when these alternative predictors are the only explanatory
variable (in addition to the pre-decimalization dummy variable), they do indeed capture some
of the predictable variation in reversal strategy returns, and they do so with the expected sign.
High idiosyncratic volatility and high TED spread should be associated with lower liquidity
supply and higher expected returns from liquidity provision, which is consistent with the
positive coeﬃcients in Table 5. For repo growth, too, the sign is as expected: high repo
growth predicts low future returns from liquidity provision. With exception of columns (10)
and (11) for the industry portfolio reversal strategy, the point estimates are also more than
two standard errors away from zero. These results provide some support for the notion that
the time-variation in expected reversal strategy returns is driven at least partly by liquidity
supply factors.
The regressions reported in columns (4), (8), and (12) show, however, that these alterna-
16Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2011) show that a risk factor constructed from broker-dealer leverage can help
explain a variety of asset pricing facts. For the purposes of the analysis in this paper, repo growth is preferable
because it is available at weekly frequency, while the broker-dealer balance sheet variables are from Flow of
Funds Accounts data, which is available only quarterly.
34Table 5: Predicting Reversal Strategy Returns: Liquidity Supply Proxies
The dependent variable is the reversal strategy return on day t (in percent), and the predictor variables are measured at the end of day
t − 5. VIX, the CBOE S&P500 implied volatility index, is normalized to a daily volatility measure by dividing it by
√
250. Idiosyncratic
volatility is measured as the cross-sectional standard deviation of individual stock returns on day t−5. TED is the spread between 3-month
Eurodollar deposit rates and 3-month Treasury Bill rates. Repo growth is the 13-week growth rate in primary dealer repo outstanding
calculated from weekly data reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. A dummy for the time period prior to decimalization
(April 9, 2001) is included as a control variable. Newey-West HAC standard errors (with 20 lags) are reported in parentheses. Quote-
midpoint returns are calculated from bid-ask midpoints of daily CRSP closing quotes (with Nasdaq stocks only). The industry-portfolio
reversal strategy is calculated with transaction prices. The sample period runs from January 1998 to December 2010.
Indiv. stocks Indiv. stocks Industry
Transaction price returns Quote-midpoint returns portfolios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept -0.09 0.16 0.23 -0.06 -0.11 0.06 0.14 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.07
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
VIX 0.12 0.05 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Idio. Vol. 8.80 2.95 7.02 2.39 2.71 0.88
(1.20) (1.35) (1.46) (1.53) (0.80) (1.02)
TED 12.08 2.24 14.22 8.53 4.50 1.73
(2.87) (3.07) (2.82) (3.30) (2.29) (2.24)
Repo Growth -0.71 -0.10 -0.86 -0.32 -0.01 0.18
(0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.36) (0.37)
Pre-decim. 0.11 0.24 0.25 0.18 -0.01 0.10 0.11 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
RM -0.64 -0.59 -0.43
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Adj. R2 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
3
5tive predictors do not fully subsume the predictive power of the VIX and the lagged market
return. Including the liquidity supply proxies jointly with the VIX leads to a substantial drop
in their slope coeﬃcients, while the coeﬃcient on VIX does not drop as much compared with
the earlier estimates in Table 2. Statistically, the coeﬃcient on VIX remains highly signiﬁcant
for transaction-price returns and marginally signiﬁcant for quote-midpoint returns and the
industry portfolio reversal strategy, while the liquidity supply proxies are mostly insigniﬁ-
cant in the joint regression. The VIX seems to contain additional information regarding the
current state of market liquidity provision that is not fully captured by the liquidity supply
proxies.
3.4 Exploring Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity
In this section, I examine the expected return from liquidity provision and its time-variation
for subgroups of stocks sorted by stock characteristics. The motivation for this is analysis
is two-fold. First, there is reason to believe that in times of ﬁnancial market turmoil the
expected return from liquidity provision increases particularly strongly among low “quality”
assets. For example, in the model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), high-volatility
assets have higher margin requirements. When market makers face a lack of capital, they
focus their liquidity provision activities on low-volatility assets and withdraw liquidity supply
from high-volatility assets. Furthermore, Naik and Yadav (2003) ﬁnd that individual dealers
on the London Stock Exchange are averse to risk that would be diversiﬁable at the dealership
ﬁrm level. To the extent that high-volatlity assets also experience the strongest increases in
volatility during periods of turmoil, one would therefore expect a more pronounced withdrawal
of liquidity supply from high-volatility assets. Second, Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006)
show that reversal strategy returns are highest among illiquid stocks, as measured by the
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. This raises the question whether all of the reversal strategy
return in the previous analysis, and its predictable variation, is driven entirely by illiquid
stocks.
36To analyze cross-sectional heterogeneity of this kind, I sort stocks into decile groups based
on three characteristics: market capitalization at the end of the prior month, the Amihud
(2002) illiquidity ratio computed as the average of the daily ratio of absolute returns and
dollar trading volume during the prior month, and the volatility of daily returns during the
prior month. To account for the fact that trading volume is counted diﬀerently on Nasdaq,
the assignment of Amihud illiquidity ratio decile ranks is done separately for NYSE/Amex
and Nasdaq stocks.
Figure 4 presents ﬁtted values from regressions of the subgroup reversal strategy returns
on VIX and a pre-decimalization dummy, as in Table 2. The ﬁtted values are evaluated at 5th
(circles) and 95th percentile (crosses) of the distribution of VIX, with the pre-decimalization
dummy set to zero. The error bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals. For comparison, the
dashed line shows the high-VIX ﬁtted value from a reversal strategy that uses all stocks, as
in Table 2.
The ﬁgure clearly shows that the lowest “quality” stocks (small, illiquid, high volatility)
generally oﬀer the highest reversal strategy returns, consistent with Avramov, Chordia, and
Goyal (2006). Even in times of low VIX, reversal strategies among these stocks oﬀer daily
returns up to roughly 0.40% per day in transaction-price returns (top row) and 0.20% per
day in quote-midpoint returns (bottom row). This is consistent with the ﬂight-to-quality
hypothesis discussed above.
In contrast, for large, liquid, low-volatility stocks, reversal strategy proﬁts are very close
to zero when VIX is low. In low volatility times, liquidity providers are apparently suﬃciently
aggressive that the expected return from liquidity provision is close to zero for all but the
lowest quality stocks. In times of high VIX, however, even the largest, most liquid, lowest-
volatility stocks exhibit statistically and economically signiﬁcant reversal strategy returns.
The magnitude of the return is on the order of about 0.1% per day for both transaction-
price and quote-midpoint returns. This may seem small compared with the much bigger
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Figure 4: Predicted daily reversal strategy returns within size-, illiquidity-, and volatility-
sorted subgroups evaluated at low (5th percentile) and high (95th percentile) VIX level.
Fitted values from regression of each subgroups reversal strategy returns on VIX and a pre-
decimalization dummy as in Table 2. Error bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals. The
dashed line shows the corresponding high-VIX ﬁtted value from the reversal strategyin Table
2 that uses all stocks .
38that 0.1% per day represents an annualized return of about 25%. This is clearly economically
signiﬁcant, especially for a strategy that uses only the largest stocks.
Overall, the evidence suggests that ﬂight to quality in times of high VIX leads to a
particularly pronounced increase in the expected returns from liquidity provision among
small, illiquid, high-volatility stocks. But the evaporation of liquidity is not conﬁned to these
types of stocks. It is a pervasive phenomenon that aﬀects the largest, most liquid, lowest
volatility stocks, too.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows that short-term reversal strategy returns can be interpreted as proxies for
the returns from liquidity provision earned by the market-making sector. In times of ﬁnancial
market turmoil, as indicated by elevated levels of the VIX index, the expected returns of these
reversal strategies rise predictably and dramatically. For example, during the ﬁnancial crisis
2007-09, expected returns of reversal strategies formed with individual stocks rose almost
ten-fold from their levels in 2006 in close lockstep with a corresponding increase in the VIX
index. Even reversal strategies formed with industry portfolios as basis assets, which are
not proﬁtable in “normal” times, earn substantial returns during times of high VIX. The
volatility of reversal strategy returns is less sensitive to the VIX than expected returns. As
a result, conditional Sharpe Ratios of reversal strategies are elevated in times of high VIX.
These ﬁndings suggest that the expected return and the risk premium earned by liquidity
providers is highly time-varying and closely related to the level of the VIX index. The same
factors that drive time-variation in the VIX index appear to drive time-variation in the returns
from liquidity provision.
Thus, at least part of the reason for the evaporation of market liquidity during periods
of ﬁnancial market turmoil seems to be that liquidity providers demand a higher expected
return from liquidity provision. Potential explanations for this phenomenon are provided by
Adrian and Shin (2010), who argue that variations in ﬁnancial intermediaries’ risk appetite
39are driven by risk-management constraints, which are more likely to be binding when VIX is
high, and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), who show that the funding of liquidity suppliers
can dry up when volatility is high.
40Appendices
A Proofs
Informed trader demand. Informed traders take as given their joint aggregate demand and
the demand function of the market maker, and CARA utility implies that their demand
function is linear in the expected dollar return of the asset,
yt = ˜ β (E[Pt+1|It] − E[Pt|It]), (A.1)
where It is the informed traders’ information set and the slope ˜ β represents the aggregate risk-
bearing capacity of informed traders divided by the variance of the asset perceived by informed
investors. Given the IID nature of the shocks in the model, we have E[Pt+1|It] = vt + st.
Informed traders conjecture (conﬁrmed below) that their aggregate price impact per unit of
order ﬂow will be 1/γ+φ, and that their aggregate demand is linear in their signal, yt = βst,
which implies







Substituting back into (A.1),











which is consistent with the conjecture that yt = βst, with
β =
˜ β













41Writing E[δt+1|Mt] = φxt, with φ deﬁned accordingly,17 substituting into the market maker’s
demand function, and imposing the market clearing condition xt +mt = 0 yields the equilib-
rium price







Using the deﬁnition of (dollar) returns Rt+1 ≡ Pt+1 − Pt, we obtain






(xt+1 − xt). (A.7)
Here δt+1 can be decomposed into a predictable (based on xt) and an unpredictable compo-
nent as δt+1 = φxt + ηt+1, which yields












as stated in the text.











Since δit and zit are cross-sectionally jointly normal IID, xit is also cross-sectionally normal
IID, which implies that we can ﬁnd the probability limit of the term in the inverse in (A.9)











17Note that, as shown above, β is a function of φ, and so the deﬁnition of φ is implicit. The explicit
expression of φ is rather complicated, and does not provide further essential intuition other than that the
aggressiveness of the informed traders’ demand, β, is moderated by the price impact that the informed traders
expect to have in aggregate.












Taking the negative of the ratio (A.11) and (A.10) yields the result stated in the text.
Reversal strategy proﬁts. Focusing ﬁrst on the inverse term in the expression for the rever-
sal strategy weights (9), and taking probability limits, it follows from the (cross-sectionally






























Taking the negative of the ratio of (A.14) and (A.12) yields the result stated in the text.
B Data
The stock return data used in this paper is from the CRSP daily returns ﬁle. Reversal
strategy returns based on transaction prices are calculated from daily closing prices, and the
reversal strategy returns based on quote-midpoints are calculated from averages of closing bid
and ask quotes, as reported in the CRSP daily returns ﬁle (for Nasdaq stocks only), adjusted
for stock splits and dividends using the CRSP adjustment factors and dividend information.
To enter into the sample, a stock needs to have share code 10 or 11. In addition, it must
have a closing price of at least $1 on the last trading day of the previous calendar month.
In a few instances, the closing bid and ask data for Nasdaq stocks on CRSP have some
43data recording errors, such as increases of bid or ask by a factor of 100 or digits that are cut oﬀ.
To screen out these corrupted records, I require that the ratio of bid to quote-midpoint is not
smaller than 0.5, and the one-day return based on quote-midpoints minus the return based
on closing prices is not less than -50% and not higher than 100%. If a closing transaction
price is not available, the quote-midpoint is used to calculate transaction-price returns.
C Robustness Checks
Predictive regression bias. Given that VIX is quite persistent, one might worry that the
predictive regressions with VIX as predictor could suﬀer from predictive regression bias.
However, the bias-adjustment proposed by Stambaugh (1999) is virtually zero in this case
here. The reason is that the time-t innovation in the predictor variable (VIX) has virtually
zero correlation with the innovation in time-t reversal strategy returns. As a result, the bias-
adjustment is also extremely close to zero. This is very diﬀerent from the situation in typical
stock market return prediction regressions with scaled price ratios as predictors, where the
correlation of these innovations is far from zero. Thus, there is little reason to believe that
the predictive regressions in the paper suﬀer from predictive regression bias.
Return horizon in construction of reversal strategy portfolio weights. The reversal strate-
gies in the main analysis are constructed as an overlay of sub-strategies with portfolio weights
conditioned on day t − 1, t − 2, ..., t − 5 returns. Table A.1 shows that focusing on the re-
versal strategy with portfolio weights conditioned on day t−1 returns only delivers a similar
relationship between reversal strategy returns and the VIX as in the main analysis in Table
2. Only for industry portfolios, the relationship with VIX becomes weak. For portfolios
like the industry portfolios in this analysis, non-synchronous trading or lead-lag relationships
between ﬁrms within an industry is a potential explanation for small short-run continuations
in industry portfolio returns. Overlaying sub-strategies with portfolio weights conditioned on
day t−1, t−2, ..., t−5 returns as in the main analysis helps to reduce the inﬂuence of these
short-run continuations.
44Alternative scaling of reversal strategy portfolio weights. The portfolio weights of the
reversal strategies in the main analysis are scaled to sum up to $1 long and $1 short. Table
A.2 repeats the regressions from Table 2 for a reversal strategy that is constructed with
alternative portfolio weights wit = −
￿PN
i=1 (Rit−1 − Rmt−1)
2
￿−1
(Rit−1 − Rmt−1). In this
case, the reversal strategy proﬁt is the negative of the slope coeﬃcient in a cross-sectional
regression of market-adjusted returns on their own lag, and hence, eﬀectively, the negative of a
cross-sectional estimate of the autocorrelation. Table A.2 shows that VIX is a strong predictor
of the proﬁts from this alternative speciﬁcation of reversal strategies. Table A.3 shows results
for a reversal strategy with weights wit = −(1/N)(Rit−1 − Rmt−1), which yields, eﬀectively,
the negative of a cross-sectional estimate of the autocovariance of market-adjusted returns.
VIX is again a strong predictor of reversal strategy proﬁts for this alternative formulation.
Heterogeneity in scale. In the model, all stocks are of the same size. In reality, there
are large diﬀerences in scale between stocks. A unit of unexpected order ﬂow has less price
impact for a large stock than for a small stock. Market maker inventory, and hence mar-
ket maker’s portfolios and proﬁts are likely to be heavily dominated by large stocks. For






i=1 |(Rit−1 − Rmt−1)Mit−1|
￿−1
(Rit−1 − Rmt−1)Mit−1 have been multiplied with Mit−1,
stock i’s lagged market capitalization. The results are similar to those of Table 2. VIX is
still strongly related to reversal strategy proﬁts. This demonstrates that the results in the
main paper are not driven just by small stocks. One notable diﬀerence, though, is that the
reversal strategy proﬁts in terms of transaction-price returns and quote-midpoint returns are
now almost identical. This reﬂects the fact that large stocks have tiny bid-ask spreads, and
hence there is hardly any diﬀerence between quote-midpoints and transaction prices.
Long and short components of reversal strategy. Table A.5 splits the reversal strategy
(9) into long and short positions to check whether there is any asymmetry in the returns
from liquidity provision between the long and short side. The reversal strategy portfolio
in (9) is split into two components: stocks with positive portfolio weight (long) and stocks
45negative portfolio weights (short). The equal-weighted market return is subtracted from the
long component and added to the short component, so that both components represent $1
long/$1short strategies. As Table A.5 shows, there is little diﬀerence in the results for the
long and short components. Only for the industry reversal strategy, there is some evidence
for a higher sensitivity to VIX on the long side which indicates that the industry reversals
arise mostly from price impact of sell orders.
46Table A.1: Predicting Reversal Strategy Returns with VIX: Reversal Strategies Formed Based on Day t − 1 returns
This table repeats the regressions from Table 2, but with reversal strategies with portfolio weights formed based on day t − 1 returns
instead of the overlay of sub-strategies formed based on day t − 1 to t − 5 returns that is used in the main text. Predictor variables are
measured on day t − 1.
Individual stocks Individual stocks Industry
Transaction-price returns Quote-midpoint returns portfolios
Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept -0.13 -0.21 -0.12 -0.06 -0.41 -0.38 -0.22 -0.13 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08
(0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
VIX 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.61 0.51 0.53 0.43 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Pre-decim. 0.70 0.72 0.70 -0.27 -0.25 -0.23 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
RM -1.52 -1.30 -2.70 -1.59 0.62 -0.12
(0.58) (0.68) (0.88) (0.89) (0.42) (0.43)
Adj. R2 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.63 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.18 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01
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7Table A.2: Predicting Reversal Strategy Returns with VIX: Reversal Strategies Scaled to Estimate Autocorrelation
This table repeats the regressions from Table 2, but with reversal strategies with portfolio weights wit =
−
￿PN
i=1 (Rit−1 − Rmt−1)
2
￿−1
(Rit−1 − Rmt−1). The reversal strategy proﬁts in this case correspond to the negative of a cross-
sectional autocorrelation estimate.
Individual stocks Individual stocks Industry
Transaction-price returns Quote-midpoint returns portfolios
Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept 1.38 1.19 1.72 2.06 0.09 0.07 0.61 0.97 -3.43 -3.51 -2.60 -2.25
(0.31) (0.26) (0.27) (0.29) (0.32) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (1.29) (1.30) (1.37) (1.07)
VIX 1.88 1.73 1.38 1.08 1.50 1.48 1.13 0.78 2.66 2.60 2.00 1.64
(0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.20) (0.86) (0.87) (0.88) (0.62)
Pre-decim. 1.63 1.70 1.80 0.15 0.23 0.41 0.63 0.76 1.02
(0.30) (0.28) (0.38) (0.30) (0.28) (0.35) (1.06) (1.05) (1.24)
RM -9.01 -2.28 -9.11 -5.30 -15.40 0.47
(2.06) (2.36) (2.40) (2.64) (9.13) (7.97)
Adj. R2 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.36 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
4
8Table A.3: Predicting Reversal Strategy Returns with VIX: Reversal Strategies Scaled to Estimate Autocovariance
This table repeats the regressions from Table 2, but with reversal strategies with portfolio weights wit = −(1/N)(Rit−1 − Rmt−1)×100.
The reversal strategy proﬁts in this case correspond to the negative of a cross-sectional autocovariance estimate of percentage market-
adjusted returns.
Individual stocks Individual stocks Industry
Transaction-price returns Quote-midpoint returns portfolios
Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept -0.66 -0.76 -0.59 -0.39 -0.62 -0.66 -0.50 -0.33 -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.08
(0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.11) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
VIX 1.05 0.98 0.87 0.72 0.79 0.76 0.65 0.53 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.07
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Pre-decim. 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.34 0.36 0.39 -0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
RM -2.85 -0.45 -2.72 -0.40 -0.54 -0.01
(0.87) (1.32) (0.96) (1.39) (0.23) (0.22)
Adj. R2 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.53 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13
4
9Table A.4: Predicting Reversal Strategy Returns with VIX: Value-weighted Reversal Strategies






i=1 |(Rit−1 − Rmt−1)Mit−1|
￿−1
(Rit−1 − Rmt−1)Mit−1, where Mit−1 is stock i’s lagged market capitalization.
Individual stocks Individual stocks Industry
Transaction-price returns Quote-midpoint returns portfolios
Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept -0.14 -0.15 -0.09 -0.05 -0.16 -0.18 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
VIX 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.25 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Pre-decim. 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.16 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
RM -1.14 -0.57 -1.18 -1.10 -0.62 -0.34
(0.28) (0.41) (0.35) (0.58) (0.34) (0.29)
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
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0Table A.5: Long and Short Components of Reversal Strategy
This table repeats the regressions from Table 2, but with reversal strategy portfolios split into those with positive portfolio weight (long)
and negative portfolio weights (short). The equal-weighted market return is subtracted from the long component and added to the short
component. The returns used in the regressions are hedged against conditional market factor exposure as in Table 2.
Individual stocks Individual stocks Industry
Transaction-price returns Quote-midpoint returns portfolios
Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly
Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
VIX 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Pre-decim. 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adj. R2 (0.05) (0.04) (0.46) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01)
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